Once they have observed information, hindsight biased agents fail to remember how ignorant they were initially, "they knew it all along." We formulate a theoretical model of this bias, providing a foundation for empirical measures, and implying that hindsight biased agents conduct incorrect learning about volatility. In an experiment involving 67 students from Mannheim University, we find that hindsight bias reduces volatility estimates. In another experiment, involving 85 investment bankers in London and Frankfurt, we find that more biased agents have lower performance. These findings are robust to differences in location, information, overconfidence and experience.
Introduction
Psychologists have extensively documented the prevalence of cognitive biases and deviations from rational choice. Are these results relevant for actual financial markets? Professionals, operating in their natural habitat and with a lot at stake, could be expected to behave rationally. Biases could be weeded out by learning and experience. Market forces and economic environments could induce optimizing. The present paper combines experimental evidence from the lab and from the field to shed light on these issues.
Decision making in financial markets relies crucially on information processing and learning. Efficient learning requires comparing new information to previous expectations. For example, after earnings announcements, investors must compare the news to their prior expectations. They must take into account the information content of the difference between the former and the latter. The hindsight bias, which is the inability to correctly remember one's prior expectations after observing new information, hinders such information processing. Biased agents are not surprised by new information, as "they knew it all along." Starting with Fischoff (1975) and Fischoff and Beyth (1975) , this bias has been amply documented by the psychology literature. 2 This literature has shown that the hindsight bias arises in a large variety of contexts and that even the knowledge of this bias does not eliminate it.
The goal of this paper is to study the consequences of the hindsight bias for an important type of economic activity: investment and trading. We propose a simple theoretical model providing a foundation for the measurement of the bias and showing that hindsight biased agents fail to assess variances correctly. When volatility is stochastic, traders need to update their assessment of risk, based on return realizations. On observing unexpectedly positive or negative returns, rational agents should raise their volatility estimates. Hindsight biased agents, who "knew it all along," fail to understand that such returns were unexpected, and thus underestimate variances. In general, hindsight biased agents will form inaccurate beliefs about asset returns and thefore make suboptimal trades and achieve inferior financial performance.
To test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias hinders learning about risk, we designed a lab experiment involving 67 students from Mannheim University. We gave the participants financial data and asked them to estimate variances. Then, we gave them new data and asked them to again estimate variances. The idea was to study how participants process this new data to update their volatility estimates. The experiment involved two treatments. In the first treatment, the experimentor reminded the participants of their initial estimates, thus muting the bias. In the second one, the experimenter asked the participants to remember their initial estimates, so that the bias could manifest itself. Consistently with our theoretical prediction, in Treatment 1 participants came up with lower variance estimates that in Treatment 0.
To test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, we collected data from 85 investment bankers working in Frankfurt or London. To assess their hindsight bias, we used the same psychometric approach as in Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) . We found these bankers to be significantly hindsight biased. And yet the questions we asked them related to their own field of expertise, such as stock market returns, macro variables or characteristics of the investment banking industry. We also found that more experienced bankers or bankers with more precise information were not less biased. Using data provided by the bank, we proxied bankers' performance by their compensation (including bonuses.) Consistent with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, we found that the bankers in the highest earnings category had the lowest bias on average. We first obtained this finding in the Frankfurt subsample. Then, to test its robustness, we collected additional data for London. In this new sample we found the same result. We also checked that our results were not driven by other variables, such as the experience, overconfidence or information of the bankers.
Our paper is in line with Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) . We use similar methods to measure the hindsight bias. But our focus and findings differ from theirs. Camerer et al (1989) showed that markets reduce but don't eliminate the hindsight bias. We complement this finding by offering new results on the consequences of the bias for information processing and financial performance. Another distinguishing feature of our paper is that our findings on the link between the hindsight bias and performance are based on data collected in the field, from highly paid and experienced investment bakers. This is in the line of several recent field experiments on financial decision and psychology. 3 Our analysis is also in the line of several recent papers empirically relating psychological constructs to economic variables (see Camerer (1987 ), Fenton O'Creevy (2003 , Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) , and Glaser, Langer and Weber (2005) .)
In the next section we present our theoretical model. In Section 3, we present our lab experiment. In Section 4, we present our field experiment. Section 5 concludes.
Theory

Defining the hindsight bias
The research on hindsight bias started with Fischhoff (1975) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) . 4 Letṽ be a random variable and I 0 the decision maker's information at some point in time t 0 . Let t 1 be a point in time, when the random event has been resolved. At time t 1 the decision maker possesses information I 1 , including the original information I 0 as well as the outcome of the random variable. The ex-ante expectation of the random variable is : E(ṽ|I 0 ). The ex-post recollection of this ex-ante expectation is:
For a rational decision maker, both expectations have to be equal. In contrast, hindsight biased agents fail to remember the initial expectation. They forget they knew only I 0 , they feel they already knew I 1 (or something close to I 1 ) at time 0. Wasserman et al (1991, p 30) describe this phenomenon as "a projection of new knowledge into the past accompanied by a denial that the outcome information has influenced judgements." Correspondingly, for hindsight biased agents the ex-post recollection of the initial belief will be closer to the realization than the true ex-ante expectation. Numerous papers in experimental psychology have shown the prevalence of the hindsight bias and discussed its measurement (see e.g., Hawkins and Hastie, 1990.) Musch (2003) finds empirically that individual differences in hindsight bias exist. This suggests that this bias acts as a trait, consistently influencing individual behavior in various environments.
The notion of hindsight bias was initially developed in the context of binary variables: v ∈ {0, 1}. In that case, the expectation is the probability that the variable takes the value one. Hindsight bias arises if the ex-post recollection of the ex-ante probability is greater when the event actually occurred. The bias arising in the general case, whereṽ is not necessarily binary, is often referred to as the "curse of knowledge." In the present paper we will not differentiate curse of knowledge and hindsight bias.
Denote by μ the a priori mean of the random variableṽ. Suppose the agent has been told the realization v of the random variable and is asked to report what was his a priori belief about the mean ofṽ. If rational, he reports E(ṽ) = μ. If hindsight biased, he fails to remember how ignorant he was initially aboutṽ. By a process of memory reconstruction he incorporates the new knowledge into his remembrance of the prior expectation (see e.g., Carli, 1999.) Thus he forms a biased recollection of the prior mean, tilted towards the realization of the random variable. This can be modelled by specifying the reconstructed prior mean of the biased agent as a weighted average of the true prior mean and of the realization of the random variable:
where the constant ω measures the magnitude of the bias andÊ v denotes the biased expectation. The subscript denotes that the biased expectation is reported after observing the realization v ofṽ. This formulation is similar to equation (1) in Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) . When asked to report the a priori mean of the distribution, rational agents are not influenced by the realization of the random variable so that ω = 0. In contrast, biased agents partially forget the ex-ante expectation. If they are completely biased, they totally forget the rational prior mean and place all the weight on the realization of the random variable (ω = 1).
Adverse consequences of the hindsight bias
Several previous papers have discussed adverse consequences of the hindsight bias (See Camerer, 2005.) For example, Mangelsdorff and Weber (1998) show that, in a principal agent relation, the hindsight bias will prevent the principal from correctly evaluating the performance of the agent. Indeed, biased principals fail to remember what was known when the agent's decision was taken. 5 Holzl et al (2002) offer evidence of hindsight bias about the economic advantages of the European Monetary Union.
One of the main disadvantages of teh hindsight bias is that it prevents rational processing of information and learning from past data. Thus, Fischoff (1982) notes that the hindsight bias will prevent one from rejecting one's hypotheses about the world:
"When we attempt to understand past events, we implicitly test the hypotheses or rules we use both to interpret and anticipate the world around us. If, in hindsight, we systematically underestimate the surprises that the past held and holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses to inordinately weak tests and, presumably, finding little reason to change them." (Fischoff, 1982, page 343.) Similarly, observing students analyzing business cases, Buksar and Conolly (1988) found that the hindsight bias hindered learning from past experience.
In financial market the inability to be surprised, to learn from the past and to reject hypotheses can be very damaging. Hindsight biased traders will fail to recognize that their view of the market was wrong. Hence they will fail to cut their losses when it is optimal to do so. Hindsight biased investors will inaccurately take into account the informational content of new signals, such as earnings announcement or macro-news. This will lead them to form suboptimal portfolios. 6 In the remainder of this subsection we focus on the adverse consequences of the hindsight bias for risk assesment.
Risk is one of the most important elements of the environment of financial decisions. Correctly factoring risk in these decisions is made difficult by the fact that volatility fluctuates randomly. Because of these fluctuations, it is important for agents to conduct efficient learning about volatility. The hindsight bias prevents such efficient learning. To see this consider the following simple model. With probability λ the random variablẽ v is normally distributed with variance σ 2 and with probability 1 − λ it is normal with varianceσ 2 , whereσ > σ. After observing one realization ofṽ, the agent has to update her beliefs about the true variance. Applying Bayes law, rational agents would update the probability that the variance is low to:
Hence:
(2) than when it was not. 6 The previous version of this paper included a formal analysis of such inefficient portfolio formation (see Biais and Weber, 2007.) Hindsight biased agents will proceed to a similar updating, except that, instead of using E(ṽ) = μ, they will rely on the biased expectation:Ê v (ṽ) = ωv + (1 − ω)μ. This leads to the following biased probability:
where, as in the case of expectations or densities, the hat denotes that the belief is hindsight biased, and the subscript v denotes that the belief is formed after observing v.
Substituting the biased expectation, we obtain:
Comparing (2) and (3), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In our framework, when agents must conduct learning about volatility, those with hindsight bias underestimate volatility.
Agents increase the probability that variance is large when they observe realizations that differ a lot from their prior expectations, i.e., when they are surprised. Hindsight biased agents tend to not be surprised: "They knew it all along." Hence they underestimate volatility.
Underestimation of risk, induced by the hindsight bias, will adversely affect decision making. Biased traders will underestimate the value of options and hedging strategies. They will inacurately assess risk return tradeoffs. They will incorrectly estimate risk premia. Hence, the hindsight bias reduces performance.
Measuring the hindsight bias
Three main different empirical designs have been used to demonstrate the hindsight bias.
1. In a within person design, subjects are first asked to report their ex-ante expectations. Then, they learn the realization of the variable. Then they are asked to report their ex-post recollection of their ex-ante expectations. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) provide evidence of hindsight-bias in this context.
2. In a between subjects design, subjects each have to report their ex-ante expectation of an event. Two groups are formed. In group one, participants receive no information. In group two, participants are told the true outcome of the event, and yet are asked to report their ex-ante expectation. Fischhoff (1975) offers evidence of hindsight bias in this context.
3.
In the third design also, two groups are formed. In group two, subjects are told the true outcome of the event and asked to estimate the average expectation of group one (knowing that that group had no information). Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) use this approach.
We now analyze in our simple model the measures corresponding to designs 1 and 3. Before being told the answer to a question, people don't know it exactly. For them it is a random variable. In line with the notation of our simple model, we denote byṽ. For simplicity we assume there is homogeneous information about this random variable. 7 In this context, first consider the "within person design" of Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) . In that design, the hindsight bias can be measured by the ratio of i) the agent's remembered estimate (Ê v (ṽ)) minus his initial estimate (E(ṽ)) to ii) the difference between the realization of the variable (v) and the agent's initial estimate (E(ṽ)). Indeed, this ratio is equal to:
.
SubstitutingÊ v (ṽ) from equation (1), this is:
Next, turn to the "between subjects design" of Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) . They form two groups (A and B) and ask a question to the participants in group B. Denote by W B the average answer of group B participants. The experimenter gives the answer v to participants in group A. Then the experimenter asks these participants to assess the average answer of group B. Denote byÊ a v (W B ) the assessment of W B by participant a in group A. The index of hindsight bias used by Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) 
i.e., the difference between a's assessment of the average group B's answer minus the actual average, divided by the difference between the true answer and group B's average answer. As noted by Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) rational agents should on average correctly estimate W B . Hence, for such agents, on average the hindsight bias index is 0. In contrast, hindsight biased agents will be influenced by the revelation of v. If they are completely biased, they will totally forget the answer was difficult to find. They will believe the others gave the exact right answer: v. Thus, for completely biased agents the hindsight bias index is 1. Now, consider partially biased agents in the context of our model. Since for simplicity we assume homogeneous information, all participants in group B should give the same answer: μ. 8 Hence, W B = μ. As stated in equation (1), once told the true answer, participant a will reconstruct a biased expectation ofṽ. Rationally anticipating that group B participants should answer the common prior, but incorrectly believing that this prior is the expectation given in equation (1), a will state:
where ω a is the hindsight bias parameter of agent a in A. Substituting W B andÊ a v (W B ) in equation (4), we obtain our next Proposition.
Proposition 2: In our framework, the Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) index for each participant is equal to his (her) hindsight bias parameter (ω a ).
Study 1: hindsight bias and risk perception
The goal of this experiment is to test whether hindsight biased agents fail to remember expost how much uncertainty there was ex-ante, and thus come up with lower risk estimates than unbiased agents. To do so we compare two treatments. In the first treatment, the hindsight bias is muted because, ex-post, the experimenter reminds the participants of their ex-ante estimates. In the second treatment, the hindsight bias can arise because the participants are not told their initial forecasts, rather they are asked to remember these forecasts. We test the hypothesis that participants give higher volatility estimates in the first treatment than in the second one.
Experimental design
The experiment was run in the context of the behavioural finance class, taught by one of the authors (Martin Weber) to fourth year students in Mannheim University. 67 students participated in the experiment, which involved two tasks.
The first task was on 29 November 2007. We gave the participants the market price of 5 German stocks (BASF, IKB, EON, Postbank, Premiere) and 2 commodities (oil and gold) as well as the euro dollar exchange rate, for November 28 and November 21. We asked them to predict the price one week later (on December 5). We also asked them to give an upper bound and a lower bound such that there would be only one chance out of ten that the December 5 price would be outside the bounds. We then transformed this confidence interval into a standard deviation using the method introduced by Keefer and Bodily (1983) . Thus we directly elicited their estimate of the expected price and indirectly estimated their estimate of the standard deviation. We resorted to such an indirect elicitation because it is more natural and intuitive for participants to give a confidence interval than a standard deviation.
The second task was a week later, on December 6. At that point we gave the participants the realized price for December 5 (and also reminded them of the November 28 price). We asked them again to give us one week ahead (for December 12) expectations and confidence intervals for the 5 stocks, the 2 commodities and the exchange rate.
Students were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. The first task was identical in the two treatments. But the second task differed. In the first treatment, on December 6, we gave the participants their estimates (prediction and bounds) from last week (formed on November 29 for December 5). In the second treatment we did not remind the participants of their estimates from the previous week. Rather we asked them to remember and write down these estimates (prediction and bounds). Thus, while in the first treatment, we muted the hindsight bias by explicitly reminding the participants of their forecasts, in the second treatment the hindsight bias could manifest itself. 35 students participated in the first treatment, 32 participated in the second treatment. At each round, we randomly drew 10 participants who each received 10 euros for participation. 9
Results
Our empirical results are summarized in Table 1 . First consider the hindsight bias. As mentioned above, in this "within person design" the hindsight bias can be measured by the ratio of i) the difference between the agent's remembered estimate and his initial estimate to ii) the difference between the realization of the variable and the agent's initial estimate. For each participant in Treatment 1, and for each asset, we compute this ratio. The first row of Table 1 reports (for each asset) the median across agents for this score (as well as, in parentheses, the p-value for the hypothesis that the score is equal to 0). 10 For all eight assets the median score is positive (and in 4 cases out of 8 it is significantly different from 0 at the 10% level). Thus participants are hindsight biased on average.
As mentioned above, the hindsight bias stems from the inability of the agents to remember ex-post how much uncertainty there was ex-ante. Our experiment offers an opportunity to document the extent to which people are able to remember previous uncertainty. In Treatment 1, on December 6, we asked the participants to remember and state the confidence interval they had previously indicated (on November 29). The initial confidence interval (given on November 29) and the corresponding implied volatility, reflected the participants' ex-ante perception of uncertainty. The remembered confidence interval (given on December 6) and the corresponding implied volatility, reflected how much the agents remembered they were uncertain ex-ante. Thus, for each of the 8 assets, we compute the median across participants in Treatment 1 of the ratio of i) the volatility estimate implied by their initial confidence interval on November 29 to ii) the volatility estimate implied by their remembrance on December 6. The medians are presented in the second row of Table 1 (along with, in parentheses, the p-values for the hypothesis that the ratio is equal to 1). 11 For 5 assets out of 8 the median ratio is strictly above 1 (and in four cases this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level). The median ratio is strictly below one for only one asset (and in that case the difference to 1 is not statistically significant). This also suggests that participants are hindsight biased on average. As far as we can tell, this is a new way to document this bias.
As discussed in the previous section, hindsight biased agents are "never surprised." In our experiment, in line with the model presented in the previous section, we measure surprise as the square of the difference between the realization and the expectation, divided by the standard deviation. When this surprise is measured using the initial expectation and volatility estimates of the agents, we refer to it as the "true surprise". When it is measured using the remembered expectation and volatility estimates, we refer to it as the "biased surprise." Of course, while the true surprise can be computed in both treatments, 9 It's likely that stronger financial incentives would not have led to significantly different results. As stated by Camerer and Hogarth (1998, page 8) , drawing the lessons of the experimental literature: "In the kind of tasks economists are most interested in, like trading in markets, bargaining in games and choosing among risky gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not change average behaviour substantially (although the variance of responses often decreases.)" 10 The figures have been rounded to three digits. 11 The figures have been rounded to three digits.
the biased surprise can be computed in Treatment 1 only. The biased surprise is a way to jointly assess the effect of the hindsight bias on expectations and on variances. For each asset and each agent we computed the true surprise and, in Treatment 1, the biased surprise. We then took the medians across agents. These medians are depicted in Table  1 , in the third, fourth and sixth rows. 12 As expected, there is no systematic ranking between the true surprises in Treatment 0 and in Treatment 1, and the differences are not significantly different from 0 (the p-levels are above 10% for all 8 assets). In contrast, for Treatment 1, the biased surprise is systematically smaller than the true surprise. However, the difference is significant in only two cases (Gold and dollar).
The main objective of this study was to test the implication from our theoretical analysis that the inability to be surprised leads biased agents to come up with lower volatility estimates than unbiased agents (see Proposition 1). To document this point we computed, for each asset and each participant, the ratio of the initial one-period ahead volatility estimate (formed on November 29) to the subsequent one-period ahead volatility estimate (formed on December 6).We then took the medians across agents. These medians are depicted in the last two rows of Table 1 . 13 For all assets except Gold, the median ratio is lower for Treatment 0, and in 4 cases the difference is statistically significant. Thus the upward revision of volatility forecasts is stronger for participants who are shown their initial estimates than for participants who are asked to remember initial estimates. This is consistent with the hypothesis that hindsight biased agents end up with lower volatility updates, because they are never surprised.
Study 2: hindsight bias and performance
While the goal of Study 1 was to analyze the effects of the hindsight bias on the way in which agents process information, the goal of Study 2 is to test its consequences for the performance of agents.
Data Collection
To assess the effect of the hindsight bias on performance in the field we collected psychometric and financial data for bankers working in a large investment bank, in Frankfurt and London. The psychometric data used in the present study was collected as part of a larger seven page questionnaire where other psychological constructs were also measured. 14 In the present study we use data relative to the hindsight bias, and also, to control for other possible effects, the miscalibration bias and the better than average effect.
The participants in the study are from the trading department of the bank. While they have various tasks (sales, research and trading), they all participate in the elaboration of portfolio allocation, trading and investment decisions.
The data was collected by inviting groups of participants into one of two conference rooms in the bank. There, they filled out the questionnaire under the supervision of an 12 The figures have been rounded to integers. 13 The figures have been rounded to three digits. 14 These variables, together with similar ones collected from another bank are analysed in Glaser, Langer and Weber (2005). experimenter. After finishing the questionnaire, which took about 30 minutes, participants were asked not to talk to their colleagues until the end of the data collection. The overall data collection effort took about two hours.
The data was collected anonymously with each questionnaire being labelled with a number. This number was used to sort the questionnaires into earnings categories. For each number the personnel department of the bank informed us whether the respondent was in the top, middle or low earning category. Earnings meant overall compensation, including bonus. Sorting subjects into three categories was a compromise between our wishes (as much performance data as possible) and the privacy requirements of the participants and institution. It should be noted that the distribution of earnings is skewed (as suggested by common wisdom and an interview with the human resource department). Therefore earnings in the low earnings and medium classes are less variable than in the high earnings class.
We first collected the data in the Frankfurt branch of the bank, on December 5, 2001. We had 41 respondents (each member of the department who was present that day). Then, to assess the robustness of our results, we collected similar data, in the London branch of the bank, on October 9, 2002. There we had 49 respondents, corresponding to the vast majority of the department. 15 Bankers in both locations had similar jobs. In Frankfurt, the questionnaire had to be approved by the management and by the worker's council. We made it very explicit that the study was done by two universities and that the management of the bank would not see any specific questionnaire. The only data made available to participants and management were aggregate data. No payments were given. Table 2 offers some descriptive statistics on the population of bankers in our sample. It shows that low and mid earnings bankers have approximately the same age in Frankfurt and London. High earnings bankers are considerably older in London. In Frankfurt the bankers are relatively equally distributed across the different departments (sales, trading, research and other). Unfortunately, the London traders did not fill in our questionnaire. Hence, the bankers in our London subsample only belong to sales and research.
Descriptive statistics
To estimate the hindsight biases of the investment bankers, we used the "between person" experimental design of Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) . We feared that highly competitive bankers would find it difficult to admit they could not perfectly forecast the future. Such considerations could have contaminated hindsight bias measures obtained in a "within person" design (see e.g., Campbell and Tesser, 1983) . 16 Our experimental design involved two types of tasks for each participant. In the first task, they were asked to estimate the true value of some unknown variables (own estimate.) In the second task, they had to guess the average answers of the other group to some questions (others estimate.) In that second task, the participants were given the true answer to the question asked to the other group. Each subject had to answer ten questions, five in the own estimate condition and five in the others estimate condition. We formed two groups in each location, hereafter referred to as Group A and B.
The items we used to measure hindsight bias were taken from the natural habitat of the bankers. Nevertheless, we used questions for which we thought they did not know exactly the correct answer. The items were similar for Frankfurt and London. Whenever it was reasonable, the questions were exactly the same for the two locations. The second sample however, was collected 10 months later than the first and in a different country. Hence, we had to change some questions to ensure comparability. For example, while in the first sample we had a question about the German consumer price index, in the second sample we changed it to a a question about the change in UK retail price index. The questions we used to measure the hindsight bias as well as the average answers are listed in Table 3 . The numbers are rounded to two digits. For each participant we computed a measure of the hindsight bias for each of the five question. Then we took the average of these five numbers.
The results in Table 3 show that the participants in our study are hindsight biased on average. This finding is similar to those of previous psychometric studies (see e.g., Hawkins and Hastie 1990) . Note that the bias is observed in spite of the fact that the questions are from the natural habitat of the bankers and that the participants are experienced professionals. 17 The degree of hindsight bias is different for different questions but between 0 and 1 in the majority of the cases. 18 Table 4 documents the mean and the median of hindsight bias of the participants, aggregated across the 5 questions. The average hindsight bias is very similar in London (.547) and in Frankfurt (.579). It is significantly lower than 1 and above 0 in both locations. The t-statistics are: 3.60 and 4.35 respectively for London, and 3.43 and 4.72 respectively for Frankfurt.
Psychometric issues 4.3.1 Precision of information
Does our measure of the hindsight bias really capture this bias, or spurriously reflects other variables? One possibility would be that it would simply mirror the precision of the knowledge of the participants regarding the questions we asked them. To check this we estimated a measure of this precision. In the own estimate treatment, for each participant and each question, we computed the absolute value of the difference between the participant's answer and the true answer. Then we summed these mistakes across questions. Finally, we normalized the total mistake or each participant by the average in his group. The greater this ratio, which we herafter refer to as the mistake ratio, the lower the precision of the information of the participant. To examine if the hindsight bias is related to the mistake ratio, we computed the correlation between the two. The Spearman correlation coefficient is -.0837. The probability to observe such a value under 17 We also collected answers to the same questionnaire from economics and management students in Mannheim University. The mean hindsight bias of the students (.92) is greater than its counterpart for bankers. But this mean is driven by a few outliers with large bias. The median hindisght bias for students (.25) is lower than its counterpart for bankers.
18 Thus the nagnitude of the hindsight bias score observed in this within person design is similar to that observed in the between person design of Study 1.
the null that the two variables are uncorrelated is 44.6%. Hence, the mistake ratio and the hindsight bias are weakly and insignificantly negatively correlated.
Underconfidence and overconfidence
Another possiblity could be that our measure of the hindsight bias would actually reflect underconfidence. The agent would believe the others to be better informed than him and than they really are. In this context, while the agent would be surprised by the realization of the random variable, he/she would believe that the others had predicted it very accurately and were not surprised. While in theory underconfidence could generate positive values for the Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) index, in practice this is unlikely to be driving the results in our experiment. As mentioned above, in our questionnaire we collected the answers to "better than average" questions. Participants were asked to answer what percentage of their colleagues they expected to perform better than themselves along four dimensions (trading skills, communication skills, market vision, technical skills.) Averaging across the four dimensions, and across participants, the bankers in our sample answered that 24.61% of the others had better skills than themselves. This suggests overconfidence rather than underconfidence. In addition, the correlation across bankers of the better than average score with the hindsight bias index is not significantly different from 0. For the Frankfurt bankers it is 0.055 (with a p-value of 0.733). For the London bankers, the correlation is 0.0975 (p-value = 0.51.)
Miscalibration
Another form of overconfidence which has received attention in finance is miscalibration (see Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) ). In line with Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and Klayman et al (1999) , we measure miscalibration by eliciting confidence intervals. We show participants ten questions. For each question we ask them to give an upper bound and a lower bound such that the true answer should lie outside the bounds with only one chance in ten. If participants were correctly calibrated, the frequency of answers lying outside the bounds should be 10%. In our sample, the frequency of such answers was 68%. While it suggests strong miscalibration, this result is not inconsistent with those obtained in other experiments. In Klayman et al (1999) the correct answer fell outside the participants' confidence range 57% of the time, while Russo and Schoemaker (1992) found that business managers had the correct answer outside the stated range between 58% and 38% of the time.
In line with this literature we thus use as miscalibration score the percentage of questions for which the true answer fell outside the indicated bounds. To assess if miscalibration is independent from the hindsight bias, we computed the correlation between the miscalibration score and the hindsight bias score. For the London sample this correlation is equal to -.1 while for the Frankfurt sample it is equal to .16. In both samples, the correlation is not significantly different from zero.
Empirical results
Up to that point we have demonstrated that investment bankers exhibit hindsight bias. We have found that our measure of hindsight is not significantly correlated with other variables such as information precision and overconfidence. But does the hindsight bias affect performance? We now turn to that question.
Main result
As can be seen from Table 5 , the hindsight bias (median as well as mean) is lower for the high earnings category than for the two other categories. The average hindsight bias is somewhat lower for the low earnings category than for the middle earnings category. Note however that when one focuses on medians the difference is not large. Table 5 also shows that, for the middle earnings category, the median bias is much lower than the mean, while for the high earnings category, the mean bias is much lower than the median, and for the low earnings category, there is no clear pattern. This suggests that the mean in the high earnings category is driven down by a few participants with very low bias, while the mean in the middle earnings category is driven up by a few participants with very high bias.
In addition, Table 5 shows that the relation between the hindsight bias of bankers and their performance is prevalent in both locations. Both in London and in Frankfurt the bankers with the highest performance are also those with the lowest bias. Such robustness speaks to the out-of-sample validity of the result. It is particularly striking since, as was mentioned above, we first designed and implemented the experiment with Frankfurt participants, and then, to evaluate the robustness of our results, we replicated the same experiment with London participants. Table 5 also suggests that the result is not driven by other variables, such as age or experience. Indeed, the age and experience structure differs in the two locations. While in London the high earnings bankers have longer experience than the middle earnings bankers (18 versus 9.9), in Frankfurt this is not the case (11.8 versus 12.5. See Table 2 ).
Tables 6 and 7 provide information about the significance of the differences in hindsight bias between the three earnings categories. In Table 6 , to evaluate significance we rely on a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test (z-stat). 19 The difference between the bias of the high earnings bankers and that of the middle earnings bankers is significant. The difference between high earners and low earners is also significant. The difference between low and mid earners is not significant. This lack of significance is consistent with the skewness of the earning distribution mentioned above. Some stars receive very high compensation, rewarding exceptional performance, while the bulk of the bankers have relatively similar compensation. Consequently, there is only a small difference between the monetary compensation of the low earnings categories and that of the middle earnings categories. This small difference is likely to be related to insignificantly different performances, and, correspondingly, biases. Table 7 reports the estimated probabilities of the performance of the bankers conditionally on their biases. To construct this table we split the bankers in three categories in terms of bias (the number of participants was the same in the three categories). Then, we estimated conditional probabilities based on empirical frequencies. In the table, the probabilities in each column add up to one. Consistently with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, the largest number in each column is on the first diagonal: bankers with the lowest bias are most likely to be high-earners, bankers with medium bias are most likely to be mid-earners, and bankers with the highest bias are more likely to be low-earners. To test the null hypothesis that performance is independent from bias, we performed a Chi square test. Since there are three rows and three columns in Table 7 , the relevant statistic is a Chi Square with 4 degrees of freedom, for which the critical value at the 5% level is 9.49. The distance between the empirical contingency table and the theoretical one (computed under the null) was found to be 10.05. The null hypothesis that performance and bias are independent can thus be rejected at the 5% level.
Robustness
Experience Experience could influence the bias of the bankers and its impact on their performance. For example, List (2003) provides evidence on the consequences of market experience on market anomalies. To control for experience we split the sample of bankers in two groups. The first group includes the bankers with less than 10 years of experience and the second group includes the bankers with 10 years of experience or more. Table  8 reports the average bias in each of these two groups. Both for the low-earnings and the high-earnings bankers, the average bias is higher for the bankers with 10 years of experience or more. This suggests that experience does not eliminate the hindsight bias. Table 8 also offers information on the robustness of the link between bias and performance after controlling for experience. Both in the junior bankers sub-sample and in the senior bankers sub-sample, the high earnings bankers are the least hindsight biased. In fact, the most successful bankers in our sample, i.e., those who are in the highest earnings category although they are still quite young, are the less biased. The figures in the table suggest there is no interaction between the effect of hindsight bias on performance and experience.
Jobs Some participants in the experiment were employed in research, others in sales, and yet others in trading (or sales and trading). As an additional robustness check, we analyzed if our results obtained for each of these three different occupational categories. Table 9 reports the estimated probabilities of the performance of the bankers conditionally on their biases, for the different occupational categories. As for Table 7 , to compute the frequencies in Table 9 , we split the bankers in three categories in terms of bias (the number of participants was the same in the three categories for each job). We classified participants as having low (resp. high bias) bias if they were among the 33% least (resp. most) biased of their occupational category. Conditional probabilities were estimated as empirical frequencies.
The results in Table 9 suggest the link between bias and performance is reasonably robust across occupational categories in the bank. Consistently with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, bankers with the lowest bias are most likely to be high-earners for research and for sales. Bankers with medium bias are most likely to be mid-earners, for sales and for trading. And bankers with the highest bias are more likely to be low-earners for research and for trading. In addition, for research and in trading, no banker with high bias has high earnings.
Mistakes Yet another robustness check is to examine whether our results still hold after one controls for the precision of the information of the participants, relative to the questions asked. As discussed above, for each participant, we computed a mistake ratio, decreasing with the precision of the answers of the agent in the own answer treatment. Interestingly, the mistake ratio varies somewhat with performance. Participants with high performance have an average mistake ratio of .890, while participants with medium performance have a mistake ratio of 1.004, and participants with low performance have a mistake ratio of 1.051. Yet, the correlation between the mistake ratio and the hindsight bias is not significant. The Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the mistake ratio of high and medium earnings is z = .549, with a p−value of .583. The Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the mistake ratio of high and low earnings is z = 1.206, with a p−value of .2278. And the Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing the mistake ratio of medium and low earnings is z = .595, with a p−value of .5516. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the mistake ratio is not significantly correlated with the hindsight bias.
To control for mistake ratios, we divided the population of bankers in three categories. The first category includes the 28 bankers with the lowest mistake ratios (their average mistake ratio is .425). The second category includes the 28 bankers with intermediate mistake ratios (their average mistake ratio is .765). The third category includes the 29 bankers with the highest mistake ratios (their average mistake ratio is 1.745). Table 10 , presents the probability of high performance, conditional on bias, estimated for each of the three categories.
Overall Table 10 suggests some robustness of the link between bias and performance, across information precisions. Consistently with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, for the three categories of mistake ratios, bankers with the lowest bias are the most likely to be high-earners.
Overconfidence Other psychological biases than the hindsight bias could affect performance. To control for such possible effects, we use the two other psychometric variables we measured: the better than average score and the miscalibration score. Table 11 presents the mean and the median of the three psychological variables (better than average, miscalibration and hindsight bias score) for the the three earnings group. As can be seen in the table, there is no strong variation in biases from one earnings group to the other. The median miscalibration score is .726 for low earnings bankers and .650 for high earnings bankers. 20 The median better than average score is .207 for the low earnings bankers and .261 for the high earnings bankers. 21 Such small variations from one earnings group to the other contrast with the large variations observed for the median hindsight bias, which falls from .636 for the low earnings bankers to .375 for the high earnings bankers. And the average miscalibration score and better than average score are not significantly different across earnings group, in contrast to what we reported above for the hindisght bias.
Conclusion
Do cognitive biases affect information processing and performance in financial markets? In this paper we addressed that question, focusing on the hindsight bias. Agents who exhibit this bias fail to remember how ignorant they were before observing outcomes and answers. We show that this hinders learning, and, in particular, lead agents to underestimate volatility. This results in inefficient portfolio choice, loss-making trades and poor risk management. We rely on two experiemental studies to test these claims.
In the first experimental study, we focus on the consequences of the hindsight bias on learning about volatility. We compare two treatments: one in which the bias is muted, and the other where it can manifest itself. Agents give lower volatility updates in the latter treatement than in the former, as implied by our model.
In the second experimental study, we test the hypothesis that the hindsight bias hurts financial performance. We collect psychometric and performance data about highly paid investment bankers. We find that they exhibit hindsight bias when asked questions about economics, banking and finance, and that experience does not reduce this bias. Most importantly, we find that bankers with low bias obtain significantly better performance.
Given that our results suggest the hindsight bias matters, it would be interesting to provide a deeper theoretical analysis of this bias. Could it emerge from cognitive constraints, such as limited memory? How would biased agents strategically interact in a trading game? We leave these issues for further research. 
